Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes)
Volume 33

Number 1

Article 7

Fall 1988

At-Will Employment and the Handsome American
Theodore J. St. Antoine
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes

Recommended Citation
Theodore J. St. Antoine, At-Will Employment and the Handsome American, 33 Law Quadrangle (formerly
Law Quad Notes) - (1988).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes/vol33/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Theodore J. St. Antoine
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This article was originally presented as a lecture given on
Nov. 19, 1987, and subsequently published by the Institute of
Industrial Relations, University of California , Los Angeles,
as The Second Annual Benjamin Aaron Lecture on the
Role of Public Policy in the Employment Relationship.
Reprinted by permission. Copyright 1988 by the Regents of
the University of California. The series commemorates the
career of Professor Emeritus Benjamin Aaron, long-time
director of the Institute and eminent scholar on the faculty
of the UCLA School of Law.

he past decade has seen a genuine
revolution in employment law, as
some 40 American jurisdictions, in
square holdings or strong dictum and
on one or more diverse theories, have
modified the conventional doctrine
whereby employers "may dismiss
their employees at will . .. for good
cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong." In this paper I shall
briefly review the theories most frequently invoked by the courts in dealing with wrongful
dismissal and indicate their deficiencies as a permanent
solution for the problem. Next, I shall summarize the
major arguments for and against the doctrine of employment at will. Finally, I shall consider some of the
particular issues that will have to be resolved in any
proposed legislation. But first, to view the whole question from a somewhat different perspective, I should
like to look at a few sociopsychological factors that may
help explain why the United States remains today the
last major industrial democracy in the world without
generalized "just cause" protections for its workers.
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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE HANDSOME
AMERICAN
Americans are known as a generous and caring people.
If a natural disaster occurs in India or Latin America,
Americans can be counted on to rally around with
medical supplies and open pocketbooks. We take such
compassionate impulses almost for granted; they go
along with our image of ourselves as the perennial
good guys, as nature's noblemen. But there may be
some darker shadows in the picture. On occasion, condescending or patronizing attitudes may accompany
our proffered aid. In the late 1950s William Lederer and
Eugene Burdick wrote a novel about this country's involvement in Southeast Asia that introduced a new
phrase into popular usage - "The Ugly American."
Significantly, for most persons, the term became shorthand for any oafish, uncouth, irresponsible citizen
abroad. Our predisposition to regard the normal cleancut American as the very embodiment of virtue blinded
us to other possibilities. In fact, the original ugly American was one of the heroes of the Lederer-Burdick book.
He spent his time out in the rice paddies helping the
natives to help themselves. The handsome, wellmanicured Americans stayed back in their isolated urban compounds, drawing up grandiose but unrealistic
plans for reshaping the countryside with giant dams
and sprawling factories.
Over the last few years I have struggled to reconcile
the notion of a caring, giving, open-hearted America
with the resistance I have frequently encountered, even
in many traditionally progressive circles, to the concept
of universal "just cause" safeguards for this country's
working persons. The image of Lederer and Burdick's
"handsome" Americans, who operated apart from the
people they were purporting to assist, and in ignorance
of their real wants and needs, led me to indulge in
some amateur psychologizing about the more appealing and enduring mythic figures of our history, and the
lessons they might impart about our national character.
I discovered that two of my own candidates as prototypical icons - the self-sufficient frontiersman and the
hard-boiled private eye, two quintessential "loners" have been taken quite seriously as national symbols in
one of the most influential of recent sociological works,
Habits of the Heart. The authors draw on such figures
from an earlier era as James Fenimore Cooper's Deerslayer, the Lone Ranger, and the beleaguered sheriff in
High Noon, and such solitary modern heroes as the detectives Sam Spade, Philip Marlowe, and Lew Archer to
illustrate a central thesis of their book: "Individualism
lies at the very core of American culture." It is, however,
an ambivalent individualism, for it involves, as these
scholars describe it, "a commitment to the equal right
to dignity of every individual combined with an effort
to justify inequality of reward, which, when extreme,
may deprive people of dignity."
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At its best, individualism produces Lederer and
Burdick's ugly but achieving and sharing American;
at its worst, as a host of sociologists and psychologists
have demonstrated, excessive emphasis on personal
responsibility can result in self-loathing by the moderately successful and a "blaming of the victim" for his
or her economic or social woes. Having failures around
to identify and derogate may even be a way for the relatively unsuccessful to justify and console themselves. An overly individualistic society is harsh and
unforgiving. Failure is invariably attributed to personal
fault and almost never to socioeconomic forces that may
often be beyond one's control. In such a dog-eat-dog milieu, it will not be easy for the fired worker to generate
much sympathy for his claims of unjust treatment.
The centrality if not primacy of individualism in
American life is hardly a new discovery. As early as the
1830s Tocqueville analyzed the phenomenon, but he
gave it only the worst of possible connotations: "Individualism ... disposes each citizen to isolate himself
from the mass of his fellows .... All a man's interests
are limited to those near himself." In his classic 1893
essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in American
History," Frederick Jackson Turner declared that it is
"to the frontier that American intellect owes its striking
characteristics," including "that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil." In that prophetic
work, An American Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal commented on the "low degree of law observance" in the
United States, noting that the "authorities ... will most
often meet the citizen's individualistic inclinations by
trying to educate him to obey the law less in terms
of collective interest than in terms of self-interest."
The national psyches of Western Europe and especially of the Orient plainly differ from ours, stressing
interdependence over rugged individualism. Thus,
psychiatrist Irvin Yalom contrasts Europe's "geographic
and ethnic confinement, the greater familiarity with
limits, war, death, and uncertain existence," with America's "expansiveness, optimism, limitless horizons,
and pragmatism." Social psychologists point out that
training for independence begins earlier in the West,
particularly in the United States, than in non-Western
societies. In Japan, specifically, "mature interdependence is defined in terms of reciprocal responsibilities,"
so that an employee's "loyalty to the firm is quite compatible with self-actualization."
The American brand of individualism is obviously
not all bad. It accounts in part for those peculiar national traits of self-reliance, inventiveness, and sheer
exuberance that have frequently been the envy of the
world. And at widely separated but perhaps equally
critical stages in our history, as Tocqueville and Myrdal
have observed, the higher values of democracy - such
as political freedom and a concern for the public welfare
- have prevailed over the grosser excesses of individualism. Perhaps it is not too quixotic to hope that, given
sufficient time for education and reflection, Americans
will appropriately reorder their values concerning the
issue of employment at will.
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JUDICIAL THEORIES
OF UNJUST
DISCHARGE
Let me now turn to a brief overview of the three principal theories employed by the courts to modify the atwill employment doctrine, along with my reasons for
believing these theories are ultimately inadequate for
the task. The three theories include tort - violation of
public policy, or "abusive" discharge; breach of an express or implied contract; and breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.

Tort Theories
The courts have acted along a spectrum of public
policy violations. At one extreme end employers have
actually fired employees for refusing to commit a crime,
such as perjury or price-fixing. I should like to think
that we are past the point when any court would countenance such an outrage. Next along the spectrum are
cases where employees are discharged for performing
a public duty, like serving on a jury or "blowing the
whistle" on wrongdoing within a company. Lastly,
there are dismissals for exercising a public right, such
as filing a workers' compensation claim.
The first type of case, where criminal conduct is importuned, is going to be easy, and also extremely rare.
After that, the issues will get tougher for the courts.
"Public policy" is a slippery concept. For example, it
may be one thing if a "whistleblower" has been subpoened to appear at an official inquiry. It may be quite
another if he has taken it upon himself to share his
good-faith but mistaken suspicions with the media,
seriously damaging his employer's reputation. Some
courts have simply thrown up their hands over public
policy claims, insisting such matters should be left to
the legislature. Except in the most egregious situations,
therefore, judicial theories of public policy are no sure
answer to the problem of unfair dismissal.
Even more nebulous is the notion of "abusive" discharge. One celebrated decision sustained a suit by a
female worker who was fired for refusing to date her
foreman. Other courts, however, have declined to remedy such personal abuse. Moreover, there is a growing
tendency to require that the public policy relied upon
be "clearly articulated" and "well accepted," or even
that it be "evidenced by a constitutional or statutory
provision." That will give small comfort to most employees who are discharged spitefully or arbitrarily.
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Contract Theories
At one time an employer's oral assurance of
"permanent" employment, or a policy statement in a
personnel manual that employees would be discharged
only for just cause, was not considered legally binding.
In the early 1980s, however, a number of courts began
taking employers at their word, and started treating
such declarations as express or implied contracts. But
many courts continued to regard these employer statements as merely nonbinding expressions of present
intent. Furthermore, individual promises of job security
will probably be given only to higher-ranking personnel, and only the more enlightened employers are likely
to issue protective policies applicable to employees generally. Thus, the person who undoubtedly needs these
safeguards the most - the rank-and-file worker in the
marginal establishment- is the very one who will get
the least.
Even where courts recognize the new contractual
qualification on employment at will, an employer can
of course avoid liability by refraining from any assurances. Clear and prominent disclaimers of any legal
intent in an employee handbook will also accomplish
the purpose. Although it is more problematical, I also
believe an employer can ordinarily purge a manual of
any guarantees against future terminations, even as to
incumbent employees. After all, one would not consider
an employer stuck forever with an existing, unilaterally
established pay scale, even if economic conditions
worsened dramatically. In short, the contract exceptions to the at-will principle seem no panacea, either.

Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Massachusetts and California have led the way in developing the most expansive judicial qualification of the
employment-at-will doctrine. This modification is based
on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which
is said to inhere in every contract. "Bad faith" has
been found when a jury concluded an employer had
dismissed an employee to avoid paying him the
full commission due on a multimillion-dollar sale, and
when an employer discharged a long-term employee
without good cause. This novel use of the good faith
concept appears contrary to its traditional function. It
has not been regarded as applicable to contract termination as such, but rather to the mutual obligation of the
parties not to interfere with each other's performance or
their receipt of the benefits of the agreement. My judgment is that most courts will follow the New York Court
of Appeals in rejecting the good-faith covenant in this
context as fundamentally incompatible with the whole
theory of at-will employment.
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THE CASE FOR JUST
CAUSE LEGISLATION
About 60 million persons work in private sector, nonunion firms in the United States, and thus are not
protected against unjust dismissal by either collective
bargaining agreements or constitutional or civil service
provisions. A careful scholar has estimated that of this
group, some two million nonprobationary employees
are discharged annually. He further calculates that
about 150,000 of these would be restored to their jobs if
they had the same just cause protections as unionized
workers. The problem is a substantial one, then, in
terms of the numbers alone.
The courts of the more progressive states, like California, Massachusetts, and Michigan, have probably
neared the limits of their willingness to modify at-will
employment. They will entertain suits alleging serious
violations of accepted public policy. They will hold employers to their unretracted word not to fire except for
good reason. But ordinarily they will not impose an
affirmative obligation on employers to prove just
cause to support a discharge. The next move therefore
seems up to the legislatures.
Conceptually, there appears little or nothing to be
said in favor of an employer's right to treat its employees
arbitrarily or unfairly. For most commentators, it is a
matter of simple justice. Perhaps the most outspoken
academic dissenter is Professor Richard Epstein of Chicago. He views at-will contracts as fair because they are
the product of freedom of contract between parties with
equal bargaining power seeking a mutually beneficial
relationship. He even suggests that workers will profit
from "risk diversification" since the contract at will
offsets "the concentration of individual investment in
a single job." The Epstein thesis exudes the rarefied
ozone of the ivory tower, not the rank air of the plant
floor. His analysis admits of no living, breathing human beings, who develop irrational antagonisms or
exercise poor judgment, on the one hand, or who suffer
the psychological as well as the economic devastation of
losing a job, on the other. Numerous studies document
the increases in cardiovascular deaths, suicides, mental
breakdowns, alcoholism, ulcers, diabetes, spouse and
child abuse, impaired social relationships, and various
other diseases and abnormalities that develop even in
the wake of impersonal permanent layoffs resulting
from plant closings. Presumably such effects are at least
as severe when a worker is singled out to be discharged
for some alleged incompetence or rule infraction. Even
if Epstein were correct in all his statements about employees collectively, this searing harm to indiviquals
would still justify eradicating the at-will principle.
This reform will probably come at some cost. Many
persons will naturally think of the employer's loss of
flexibility in its operations, and the need for extra staff
in the personnel office. That will almost surely be a
piece of the story but it may not be the whole by any
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means. One scholar has suggested a lower wage level
could result because the more stable and attractive employment situation would cause both a decrease in the
demand for labor and an increase in the supply. In
effect, the employees themselves would pay at least
partially for their greater job security. That is· a timehonored tradeoff among unionized workers, however,
and should not be considered inappropriate here. There
is also evidence that the net increase in employers' costs
in maintaining a for-cause discharge system would
not be exorbitant. For example, in all the demands by
unionized firms for "givebacks" or bargaining concessions during the early 1980s, scarcely ever did employers seek to remove "just cause" contract clauses, or the
grievance and arbitration procedures to enforce them.
The "competitiveness" of American business in international markets should not be markedly affected by
the elimination of at-will employment. Statutory protection against unfair discharge now exists in about 60
countries around the world, including all of the Common Market, Sweden and Norway, Japan, and Canada.
We are the last major holdout against the recommendations of the International Labor Organization in 1963
and again in 1982 that workers not be terminated except
for a valid reason. Furthermore, experience both here
and abroad suggests that the prevention of arbitrary
treatment of employees may be not only humane but
good business as well. Significant correlations have
been shown between a secure work force and high
productivity and quality output.
A more rational, systematic method of dealing with
wrongful terminations would save many employers
the crushing financial liability imposed by emotionally
aroused juries under our existing, capricious commonlaw regime. For example, separate studies at different
times by a plaintiff's attorney and a management attorney in California indicated that plaintiffs won between
78 and 90 percent of the cases that went to juries, with
the awards averaging between $425,000 and $450,000.
Jury awards for single individuals have gone as high as
$20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million, and $2.57 million. Eventually, an informed employer lobby might
well conclude that comprehensive just cause legislation,
which would exclude jury verdicts and punitive
damages, was the more favorable alternative.
There are signs, indeed, of some movement, glacial
though it is. Bills forbidding wrongful discharge have
been introduced in a dozen or more legislatures. In addition to the positive recommendations of the special
committee of the California Bar's Labor and Employment Law Section, the individual rights committee of
the ABA Section on Labor and Employment Law has
drafted a questionnaire regarding the critical issues to
be considered in any proposed law. The AFL-CIO's
Executive Council has ended organized labor's longstanding ambivalence on the subject by endorsing the
concept of wrongful discharge legislation. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have decided to draft
a model statute. And just a year ago Montana became
the first state to adopt a comprehensive law protecting
employees against unjust discharge.
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STATUTORY
PROPOSALS
Coverage
In the higher ranges of management, one official's
evaluation of another's business judgment may become
so intertwined with questions of fair treatment that the
two cannot be separated. These top executives should
be excluded from coverage. On the other hand, shop
foremen and supervisors who are not protected by the
National Labor Relations Act because they are management's representatives with rank-and-file employees do
not present such potential conflicts of interest under
just cause safeguards, and should be covered. Several
proposed bills draw the line by excepting persons entitled to a pension above a certain amount, or persons
with a fixed-term contract of two years or more. Probationary employees may also be excluded. Six months
is a common probation period but a California bill
specifies two years. That is the sort of quantitative
issue which lends itself to compromise.
Small employers may be more prone to arbitrariness and individual spite than large, structured
corporations. But we hesitate to intrude into the
sometimes intensely personal relationships of tiny establishments. A suitable dividing line, at least at the
outset, would seem to be employers having between
ten and 15 or more employees.
Public employees generally have constitutional guarantees against the deprivation of their "vested" job
interests without due process. About half also have
more specific civil service or tenure protections against
unjust dismissal. It would seem sensible to adopt the
approach of several bills in limiting new protections to
private industry.
I see no principled grounds for treating organized
employees differently from the unorganized with respect to basic statutory safeguards. If workers in
general are entitled to invoke a just cause standard, the
same public policy should arguably apply to all, regardless of the existence of parallel protections in collective
bargaining agreements. Federal precedent for such an
approach exists in both the NLRA and civil rights legislation. Nonetheless, there would be federal preemption
problems with state laws, and procedural problems in
accommodating contractual and statutory rights. There
may be much practical wisdom in the solution of several
bills to finesse all these complications by excluding
unionized employees.

Standard Applicable and Discipline Affected
My proposal would be to articulate a standard for
discharge or discipline in terms of "just cause" or
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equivalent language, without further definition but perhaps with a few illustrative reasons. Even in Western
Europe, which had nothing like the body of American
arbitral precedent to draw upon, there has apparently
been little difficulty in applying broadly phrased statutory criteria. Any effort at specificity is bound to risk
underinclusiveness. Decisionmakers should be able to
flesh out "just cause" much as have our arbitrators.
Outright discharge, the so-called "capital punishment" of industrial relations, is the usual target of all
these proposals. But an extended suspension, a demotion, or an onerous job assignment can be almost as
bad. Yet we shrink from subjecting every shop discipline to governmental review. The solution of several
bills is to cover "constructive" discharge as well. An
employee who feels sufficiently aggrieved may quit,
and then test the legitimacy of the employer conduct
that triggered her departure.

Enforcement Procedures
Administration and enforcement of new just cause
legislation will have to be lodged in the courts, or in
existing or newly created executive departments or
administrative agencies. I would join most persons in
ruling out the courts as too formal, too costly, and too
slow. Beyond that, I think the locus of administration is
less significant than whether we follow the hearing
officer-agency model or the arbitration model. With a
unanimity rare among their contentious tribe, those
arbitrators confronting the issue have invariably opted
for arbitration. I go along with my colleagues. I like to
think our dockets are already so bulging that we could
not possibly be impelled by crass commercial considerations; I do believe there are valid, objective reasons
for our choice.
The arbitration format would immediately make
available the vast body of arbitral precedent concerning
substance and procedure that has been developed in
countless decisions over the years. It would permit the
use of an established nucleus of experienced arbitrators,
and of the growing number of young, able aspirants
who Robben Fleming demonstrated some years ago are
objectively qualified to render acceptable decisions, especially in the more straightforward disciplinary cases.
Arbitration would facilitate maximum flexibility, at least
until more is learned about future caseloads,
because there would be no need to engage a large permanent staff at the beginning. The relative informality
and speed of arbitration - though both those qualities
are too often much eroded - should also appeal to
rank-and-file employees. One drawback of arbitration
for employees, however, might be that, in keeping with
the pattern in the unionized sector, and in recognition of the strained financial resources of most states,
the parties themselves would have to bear the cost
of the arbitrator.
It would seem highly desirable to have some screening mechanism in the statutory procedure to avoid
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a flood f hearings. The most obvious would be
a preliminary mediation stage of minimum duration,
a provided by California and Michigan bills . One
kn wledg able b erver would have an official in the
admini t ring agency make a "reasonble cause" determination bef re a case could go to arbitration. Such a
requirement would be especially appropriate if the state
wa to bear a major hare of the cost of the proceeding . The arbitrator' award itself should be final and
binding, with ut the need for agency adoption or
review a in the case fa hearing officer's report or deciion. Ordinarily, of course, the courts will not set aside
a privat arbitration award unless the arbitrator
e ceed d hi jurisdiction or the award was obtained
by fraud, bribery, or imilar means. Those criteria
ought to apply here.

Remedies
Remedies for unjust discharge in the United State
have traditi nally included reinstatement, with or without back pay. In Europe rein tatement i thee ception .
Apparently it is felt that future relations between the
employer and the unwanted employee will be too
strained, and that the employee is better off to leave
with a flat severance payment. A number of American
e perts al o seem to believe that reinstatement i
unfeasible without the presence of a labor union to upport the restored employee. l believe an award of
severance pay in lieu of reinstatement hould be an option available to the arbitrator. But I would not preclude
reinstatement out of e ces ive solicitude f r the employee. A rein tatement order may al furnish e tra
bargaining leverage to the emplo ee in neg hating an
future ettlement with the employer.
The tradeoff for employers w uld be the eliminati n
of jury verdicts, compensator and puniti e damage ,
award f r pain and mental suffering, and the like.
Something rather analogous occurred in the second
decade of this century, when employer wapped their
powerful comm n law defen e to torti u injury of
employee in the workplace in return for then -fault
worker 'c mpen ati n ystem and it denial of compen ator and puniti e damage . De pite me
occa ional creak in the joints, w rker 'c mpen ation
has generall erved u well. It ma tand a a alutary
precedent f r mutual accomm dation in ur pre ent
deliberation over wr ngful di mis al.
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impaired, even shattered, minds and bodies, there is
a genuine question of identity involved . Studies have
found that "most, if not all, working people tend to
describe themselves in terms of the work groups or organizations to which they belong. The question 'Who
are you?' often elicits an organizationally related response .... Occupational role is usually a part of this
response for all classes: 'I'm a steelworker,' or 'I'm a
lawyer.' " To lose one's job is, in a true sense, to risk
one's very being.
Rugged individualists though we may be, Americans
eventually - if sometimes belatedly - recognize moral
and social imperatives. In my view, reform of wrongful
termination has now assumed that status, and I am
confident we shall respond. But I do not expect a widespread response any time soon. It took us some 50
years longer than that hardly liberal statesman,
Chancellor Bismarck of Germany, to see the need
for social security.
On that timetaole, counting from the ILO's initial call
for just cause legislation in 1963, we shall have accomplished the task by the year 2013.
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CONCLUSION
The social p ych logi ts - and the medical diagno tician - ar nly beginning t a e th full meaning
of th 1
fa j b. At lea t we can n w p rceive that
profound valu ar at take, n t ju t ec n mic hardhip. Bey nd the clinically b ervabl
mpt m f
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